Hankyoreh: [Guest essay] True resolution of the ‘comfort women’ issue, as both victim and perpetrator state

한글원문 링크: https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/because/1214313.html

How this administration deals with the “comfort women” issue will determine if Korea’s moral authority matches its economic stature

By Phyllis Kim,
executive director of Comfort Women Action for Redress and Education (CARE)

In his Liberation Day address, President Lee Jae Myung struck two clear notes on relations with Japan. First, Korea and Japan are inseparable partners who must build a future on trust. Second, Japan must confront its past, and the more sincerely it does so, the more it will ultimately benefit itself.

These are important messages. Yet, as always, the devil lies in the details.

When survivor Kim Hak-soon broke decades of silence in 1991 and evidence emerged of the Japanese military’s deep involvement in the “comfort station” system, Tokyo offered partial responses: the 1993 Kono Statement and the privately funded Asian Women’s Fund.

But the international community was not convinced. UN special rapporteurs in 1996 and 1998 were explicit: while Japan’s gestures were notable, true resolution demanded far more — clear acknowledgment of responsibility, full disclosure of truth, official apology, legal compensation, prosecution of perpetrators, and sustained education.

These demands echoed the voices of survivors around the world who had already been united in calling for justice. Out of this moment came a critical international standard: how states must take responsibility for state-sponsored grave human rights violations.

Eighty years after the war, some now argue that reaffirming the Kono and Murayama Statements should close the book on the “comfort women” issue. But history reminds us that the survivors themselves rejected those measures at the time as inadequate.

For more than three decades, they carried on their struggle precisely because they sought recovery of their dignity and honor in a true sense, not half measures. What was not a solution then cannot be a solution now.

Meanwhile, Japan has doubled down, using its financial and diplomatic power to obstruct UNESCO registrations, push for the removal of “comfort women” memorials, and distort history. This is not reconciliation — it is re-traumatization.

Korea, too, must ask whether it has pursued a survivor-centered resolution.

The 2015 Park Geun-hye-Abe agreement was a nadir: a backroom political deal without parliamentary approval or legal binding force, yet one that claimed the issue was “finally and irreversibly resolved” and even sought to muzzle both governments from raising the matter internationally. Despite repeated UN recommendations urging a victim-centered approach, Tokyo has since used the deal to deny responsibility and pressure for the removal of statues worldwide.

The Moon Jae-in administration tried to reverse course — reviewing the deal, dissolving the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation, and making up the 1 billion yen with its own money so it could be returned to Japan later. Yet by conceding at the end of his term that the 2015 deal was still an “official agreement,” Moon left the matter even more entangled.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration, with its wholesale embrace of Japan’s position, hardly merits discussion here.

Now, with the impeachment of Yoon through the “Revolution of Light” and the election of President Lee Jae Myung, Korea may have its final chance. The “two-track” approach that Moon promised but never delivered — treating economic and security cooperation separately from historical justice — must finally be realized. Only by demanding a sincere apology and reflection from Japan can Korea honor its survivors and uphold international human rights norms.

But Korea, too, has a past it must face.

This summer, Seoul welcomed the Vietnamese prime minister as a state guest, pledging deeper economic and cultural cooperation. But for Vietnam, Korea is not only a partner — it is also a perpetrator.

Victims of massacres committed by Korean troops during the Vietnam War are still in court, where the Korean government continues to wage an intense courtroom fight. The Vietnamese government, prioritizing national interest, has chosen silence.

Yet silence from the victim’s government does not absolve the perpetrator state. Korea must act of its own accord: withdraw its appeals, confront its wartime atrocities, and offer an unambiguous apology—not only for the massacres but also for the widespread sexual violence, including justice for the Lai Dai Han, children born of wartime rape.

If Korea follows Japan’s path of evasion and denial, it cannot claim the mantle of a human rights leader. But if Korea follows Germany’s example — offering sincere apologies and concrete remedies — it can strengthen ties with Vietnam and exert new moral pressure on Japan to resolve the “comfort women” issue.

Lee’s administration faces crises across the board — economy, security, diplomacy and inter-Korean relations. Yet the way Korea handles the “comfort women” issue will define more than its bilateral ties with Japan. It will determine whether Korea emerges as a global leader in human rights, a nation whose moral authority matches its economic stature.

This is not just another policy challenge. It is a test of national integrity. President Lee now holds the responsibility — and the opportunity — to resolve this issue with courage and conviction.